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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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FROM:

The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT:

Failure of JAKIC to Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value.

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- 2. More specifically, if the JAEIC had known of the implications of the Fuchs case in June 1949 at the time when the July estimate was being written, the estimate of the time by which the Soviets could have obtained their first bomb would have been appreciably advanced, as no allowance was made in making that estimate for successful espionage on details of bomb design and construction. Of course, the JAEIC does not know how long French has been under investigation, but the fact still remains that the JECC was not informed until after the man's arrest.
- 3. If the pattern set forth above is followed, it seems obvious that much counter espionage information will not be made available. The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of the investigations of a Congressional Committee or the arrest of the offenders in isolated instances. This is very unsatisfactory free the standpoint of time, as the information is so old by the time we get it that it is of little value.
- 4. The JAEIC desires to point out to the SIC this possibly large area of information which is being denied us. Furthermore, in view of the particity of information from other sources, the elimination of this deficient is urgently necessary if the JAEIC is to perform its duties adequately.

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5. The JAEIC recommends that this situation be brought to the attention of the IAC as soon as possible in order that remedial action on a high level may be instituted.

Intelligence Committee

Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy

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